State of Utah v. Gary E. Steeley : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah v. Gary E. Steeley : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Laura Dupaix; assistant attorney general; attorney for appellee.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold & Wiggins; attorneys for defendant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Steeley, No. 980358 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1623
IN THE UTAH COURT OF fc'FP'EA'LS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
GARY E, STEELEY, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 980358-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TOSSXTI Ktf.Y,¥ OY KTC^UASTC 
Appeal from Judgment of conviction upon a plea of 
guilty to Sodomy Upon a Child, a first degree felony, 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-403.1, and to Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance, a felony of the first degree, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), the Honorable 
Michael G. Allphin presiding. 





Ms. Laura Dupaix 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
SCOTT L WIGGINS 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-4333 
(801) 328-4351 (Facsimile) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
FEB 11 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
GARY E, STEELEY, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 980358-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Judgment of conviction upon a plea of 
guilty to Sodomy Upon a Child, a first degree felony, 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-403.1, and to Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance, a felony of the first degree, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), the Honorable 
Michael G. Allphin presiding. 
Ms. Laura Dupaix 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
SCOTT L WIGGINS 
ARNOLD Sc WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-4333 
(801) 328-4351 (Facsimile) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 3 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO STRICTLY 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11 IN THE COURSE OF TAKING 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA AND THEREBY ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 4 
II. BECAUSE APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
OBJECT WAS NOT A "CONSCIOUS DECISION" TO WAIVE THE 
ISSUE CONCERNING THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11 IN THE COURSE OF 
TAKING DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA, THE DOCTRINE OF 
INVITED ERROR DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE . . .7 
III. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, DEFENDANT'S 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT DOES NOT CONTAIN 
ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN THE LETTER 
SENT FROM DEFENDANT'S EX-SPOUSE TO THE TRIAL COURT 








State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993) 4 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1990) 7 
State v. Cook, 881 P. 2d 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 8 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), on subsequent 
appeal, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) 4,5 
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) 5 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Thurston, 781 P. 2d 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 5 
STATUTES CITED 
None. 
See cases, etc., cited above in passim 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO STRICTLY COMPLY 
WITH RULE 11 IN THE COURSE OF TAKING DEFENDANT'S 
GUILTY PLEA AND THEREBY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA. 
In its Brief, the State argues that Defendant waived his claim 
that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 in the course of 
taking Defendant's guilty pleas. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 24-26. 
The State's argument is fatally flawed because it not only ignores 
well-settled principles concerning the trial court's obligations in 
taking a guilty plea, but it ignores critical facts surrounding 
Defendant's guilty plea in the instant case. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1312 (Utah 1987), stated that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." 
Gibbons, by virtue of subsequent case law, created a "strict 
compliance" rule requiring the trial court to "personally establish 
that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and 
establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or 
her constitutional rights and understood the elements of the 
crime." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); see also 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1991); State v. Hoff, 
814 P. 2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) . The purpose of requiring strict 
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compliance with Rule 11 is to ensure that a defendant pleads 
"freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the consequences of 
the plea." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986). 
In the course of advancing its argument, the State all but 
fails to recognize that Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(g)(2) 
requires the trial court to "advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court." 
See State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
accord Kay, 111 P. 2d at 1299. In fact, the State goes so far as to 
assert, without any authoritative support whatsoever, that "[t]he 
absence of any promised sentencing recommendations by the 
prosecutor made a personal advisement that the court would not be 
bound by any sentencing recommendations unnecessary." Brief of 
Appellee, p. 24. The State's misinterpretation of the requirements 
of Rule 11, by virtue of its argument, flies in the face of the 
"strict compliance" rule of Gibbons. In addition, the plain 
language of Rule 11(g)(2) directly contradicts the State's 
argument. Rule 11(g)(2) provides, "If sentencing recommendations 
are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to the sentence is not 
binding on the court." At the hearing on the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea, Defendant testified that the prosecutor 
represented that he would recommend, among other things, that the 
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penalties run concurrent. Contrary to the State's allegation in 
its Brief that there were no such promises, the prosecuting 
attorney, who was present at the sentencing hearing, stated the 
following: 
Mr. Namba (the Deputy Davis County 
Attorney who negotiated the guilty plea), for 
whatever reason, at least I do not have 
anything in the file, did not address the 
other charge relative to a sentencing 
recommendation which I understand is also a 
first degree felony but does not carry a 
mandatory imprisonment term nor did he choose 
to address the issue of consecutive. In that 
respect, Your Honor, we would defer to the 
Court's judgment on those matters as far as 
the sentencing of Mr. Steeley. 
(R. 145, lines 12-19, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing). Not only 
does the foregoing quotation contradict the State's argument, it, 
at the very least, corroborates Defendant's testimony concerning 
the prosecutor's promise to recommend that the sentences run 
concurrent. Moreover, the aforementioned quotation, as well as 
other quotations at the sentencing hearing, establishes that the 
trial court allowed sentencing recommendations (see id. at R. 144-
45) and thereby was required by virtue of Rule 11(g)(2) "to advise 
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to the sentence 
is not binding on the court." This, as the record clearly 
indicates, the trial court failed to do. 
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II. BECAUSE APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT 
WAS NOT A "CONSCIOUS DECISION" TO WAIVE THE ISSUE 
CONCERNING THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO STRICTLY 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11 IN THE COURSE OF TAKING 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA, THE DOCTRINE OF INVITED 
ERROR DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
The State further argues, by virtue of the doctrine of invited 
error, that "[t]his Court should decline to address defendant's 
rule 11 issue because he affirmatively waived that claim below, 
thereby rendering the plain error doctrine inapplicable." See 
Brief of Appellee, 24-26. In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court, in addressing the invited error doctrine, stated: 
[W] e do not appraise all rulings objected to 
for the first time on appeal under the plain 
error doctrine . . . . [I]f a party through 
counsel has made a conscious decision to 
refrain from objecting or has led the trial 
court into error, we will then decline to save 
that party from the error. . . . 
Id. at 158 (Emphasis added).x 
The State is simply inaccurate by arguing that appointed trial 
counsel made a "conscious decision" not to raise the trial court's 
failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in the hearing on the 
!The Utah Supreme Court also stated, "If the decision was 
conscious and did not amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, this Court should refuse to consider the merits of the 
trial court's ruling." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1990) (Emphasis 
added). Therefore, not only must the decision by trial counsel 
be a consciously made decision, it must be one that does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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motion to withdraw the guilty plea. In fact, it stretches 
credulity beyond the bounds of reasonability to think that 
appointed trial counsel, if she had been aware of the failure by 
the trial court to strictly comply with Rule 11 in the taking 
Defendant's plea, would consciously decide not to raise this issue. 
Further, it is equally implausible how appointed trial counsel 
could think this may benefit Defendant in such a manner so as to 
attempt to "have-her-cake-and-eat-it-to." See State v. Cook, 881 
P.2d 913, 915 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Other than the State's 
implausible bare assertions, the record is bereft of any indication 
as to why appointed trial counsel did not raise the trial court's 
failure to comply with Rule 11. 
III. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, DEFENDANT'S 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT DOES NOT CONTAIN 
ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN THE LETTER SENT 
FROM DEFENDANT'S EX-SPOUSE TO THE TRIAL COURT PRIOR 
TO SENTENCING. 
The State argues that Defendant's constitutional right to due 
process was not violated by the failure to provide Defendant with 
the opportunity to examine and to respond to the allegations 
contained in the letter sent by Defendant's ex-spouse to the trial 
court prior to sentencing. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 31-34. 
While some of the allegations contained in the letter sent from 
Defendant's ex-spouse to the trial court were contained in 
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Defendant's Presentence Investigation Report, the State fails to 
acknowledge that at least two of the allegations were not contained 
in the Presentence Investigation Report. 
In the letter sent from Defendant's ex-spouse to the trial 
court prior to sentencing, Defendant's ex-spouse alleges, among 
other things, that Defendant had refused to pay debts for which he 
was responsible, i.e., a $4500.00 debt for a vehicle loan, that 
Defendant had defaulted on payments under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
filing in 1995, and that Defendant had failed to pay two years of 
property taxes on their house, which he had previously, and 
apparently fraudulently, claimed in his tax returns. (R. 150-51, 
Letter from Ms. Sally D. Jensen to Judge Michael G. Allphin, dated 
October 6, 1997, and filed October 15, 1997; a true and correct 
copy of the 10/06/97 Letter from Ms. Sally D. Jensen to Judge 
Michael G. Allphin is attached to the previously filed Brief of 
Appellant as Addenda B) . Contrary to the State's assertions, 
nowhere in the Presentence Investigation Report are the 
aforementioned allegations of Defendant's ex-spouse contained. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that contained in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Defendant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of the 
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motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's instructions as stated in 
its opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD QF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument 
will materially enhance the decisional process due to the 
significant and novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with 
strict compliance with Rule 11 and the voluntariness of guilty 
pleas, ineffective assistance of counsel, and due process in the 
course of sentencing, which, based on the facts of the instant 
appeal, involve issues requiring further development in these areas 
of criminal law for the benefit of bar and public. Counsel for 
Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of precedential value and direction in 
future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | Hf) daY o f February, 1999. 
//^^AR^O^b\& WIGGINS, P.C. 
TStiutrL "L Wiwgins 
Attorne;^—s#r Appe l lan t 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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